Unfaithful but Not Without Privacy Protections: The Seventh Circuit Addresses When Courts Should Consider an E-Mail Interception Unlawful in \u3cem\u3eEpstein v. Epstein\u3c/em\u3e by Noreña, Joseph
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 9 Electronic Supplement Article 22
4-26-2018
Unfaithful but Not Without Privacy Protections:
The Seventh Circuit Addresses When Courts
Should Consider an E-Mail Interception Unlawful
in Epstein v. Epstein
Joseph Noreña
Boston College Law School, joseph.norena@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Communications Law Commons, Computer Law
Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Noreña, Unfaithful but Not Without Privacy Protections: The Seventh Circuit Addresses When Courts Should Consider an E-Mail
Interception Unlawful in Epstein v. Epstein, 59 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 391 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss9/22
 
 
391 
UNFAITHFUL BUT NOT WITHOUT PRIVACY 
PROTECTIONS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ADDRESSES WHEN COURTS SHOULD 
CONSIDER AN E-MAIL INTERCEPTION 
UNLAWFUL IN EPSTEIN v. EPSTEIN 
Abstract: On December 14, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, in Epstein v. Epstein, held that contemporaneousness is not a determi-
native factor at the pleadings stage of a claim for the unlawful interception of elec-
tronic communications under the Federal Wiretap Act (“FWA”). In so doing, the 
Seventh Circuit partly departed from the way in which other Federal Circuit Courts 
had previously considered the statutory language of the FWA, specifically the defi-
nitions of “electronic communication” and “intercept” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), 
(12). This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit’s holding that contemporane-
ousness is not a determinative factor at the pleadings stage stands more in line with 
the congressional intent of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”), which aims to provide privacy protections to electronic communica-
tions. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (“ECPA”), it amended the Federal Wiretap Act (“FWA”) in order to pro-
vide privacy protections to electronic communications.1 One of the driving 
forces behind the ECPA was to provide greater privacy protections to e-mail 
and other computer-to-computer communications, which had rapidly become 
popular forms of electronic communication.2 Title I of the ECPA allows a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848–50 
[hereinafter ECPA] (amending various sections of Title 18 the United States Code—which read to-
gether are considered the FWA—to cover the interception of electronic communications); see also S. 
REP. NO. 99-541, at 3–4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556–58 (clarifying that the 
ECPA added the protection of electronic communications because Congress sought to protect the 
privacy of electronic communications). Electronic communication is the transfer of sensory materials 
by a wire or electronic system that has an effect on interstate or foreign commerce, such as the transfer 
of e-mail. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012); see also Tatsuya Akamine, Note, Proposal for a Fair Statuto-
ry Interpretation: E-Mail Stored in a Service Provider Computer Is Subject to an Interception Under 
the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 519, 521–22 (1999) (arguing that the ECPA, enacted to ex-
tend coverage of the FWA to e-mails, is the most important piece of legislation that protects e-mail 
privacy interests). 
 2 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (citing a letter written in 1984 from Senator Patrick Leahy to the De-
partment of Justice in which Senator Leahy inquired as to whether current federal law protected e-
mail and computer-to-computer communications); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 21–22, 34 (1986) (elabo-
rating on the expansion of the ECPA to cover electronic communications); see also Ariana R. Levin-
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plaintiff or the U.S. Attorney General to sue for injunctive relief and civil dam-
ages if a plaintiff can show that a defendant unlawfully intercepted their wire, 
oral, or electronic communications.3 A plaintiff must establish that an intercep-
tion, defined as the “aural or other acquisition,” of wire, oral, or electronic 
communication by some type of device, has occurred.4 Consistent with Con-
gress’s goal, the FWA, as amended by the ECPA, is used to protect the privacy 
of wire, oral, and electronic communications.5 In 2015, Barry Epstein asked 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and later the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to assess whether he could use the 
ECPA as a “tactical weapon” in a divorce to effectively quash his spouse’s sur-
reptitiously obtained e-mail evidence of his extramarital affairs.6 
In Epstein v. Epstein, in 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois dismissed Barry Epstein’s ECPA claims against his wife, 
Paula Epstein, and her lawyer, Jay Frank.7 The claims arose out of Paula’s al-
leged unlawful interception of Barry’s e-mails and Frank’s alleged unlawful 
disclosure of those e-mails when Frank disclosed them during divorce pro-
ceedings between Barry and Paula.8 The District Court granted Paula’s motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Barry 
                                                                                                                           
son, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for the Elec-
tronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 480 (2012) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541 and 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 to explain the legislative intent of the ECPA). 
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (authorizing injunctive relief and the recovery of civil damages for any 
plaintiff whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted in violation of the ECPA); see 
also id. § 2521 (authorizing the Attorney General to bring a civil action in which a court may grant 
injunctive relief against a person engaging in or about to engage in activity illegal under the ECPA). 
Wire communication is the transfer of any communication that is able to be heard with the help of a 
wire, cable, or other like connection. Id. § 2510(1). Oral communication is any communication uttered 
by a person with the expectation of privacy. Id. § 2510(2). 
 4 See id. § 2510(4) (defining intercept under the FWA); id. § 2511(1)(a) (explaining that Title 18 
of the United States Code prohibits the intentional interception of wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions). 
 5 See, e.g., Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2016) (reversing a district court’s dis-
missal of an ECPA claim because the claim sought to protect private e-mail and other Internet com-
munications, both classified as electronic communication); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 
1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a third party unlawfully intercepted a voicemail on a private phone, 
classified as a wire communication); see also Michael D. Roundy, Note, The Wiretap Act—
Reconcilable Differences: A Framework for Determining the “Interception” of Electronic Communi-
cations Following United States v. Councilman’s Rejection of the Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 403, 415 (2006) (explaining that Congress passed the ECPA in part to provide the 
same privacy protections to electronic communications that were already in place for wire and oral 
communications). 
 6 Epstein v. Epstein, 843 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 2016); see Epstein v. Epstein, No. 14 C 8431, 
2015 WL 1840650, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2015) (explaining that Barry Epstein’s amended com-
plaint alleged ECPA violations against his wife, Paula Epstein, for unlawfully intercepting his e-
mails). 
 7 Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1148–49. 
 8 Id. at 1149. 
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had failed to allege that Paula intercepted his e-mails contemporaneously with 
transmission of those e-mails.9 The District Court reached this conclusion 
based on the decisions of several Federal Circuits, which have held that con-
temporaneousness is a determinative factor in considering whether an intercep-
tion is unlawful under the ECPA.10 Federal Circuit courts have defined a con-
temporaneous interception of electronic communications as an interception 
that occurs at the same time that electronic communication is being transmit-
ted.11 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal.12 Even if con-
temporaneousness were a determinative factor later on at trial, contemporane-
ousness was not a determinative factor at the pleadings stage because of the 
ambiguity surrounding when exactly an e-mail is in transit.13 
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit correctly held in Epstein that 
contemporaneousness is not a determinative factor in considering whether a 
plaintiff has made a plausible claim for an unlawful interception under the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. (explaining the district court’s reasoning and defining a contemporaneous interception as 
obtaining an electronic communication in transit); see also Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 
F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring that an interception actionable under the ECPA must occur 
contemporaneously, meaning intercepted at the initial transmission of the e-mail). 
 10 See Epstein, 2015 WL 1840650, at *2–3 (citing to four different Circuit Courts of Appeal to 
support its proposition that a defendant must intercept e-mails contemporaneously in order to violate 
the ECPA). The Fifth Circuit was the first appellate court to decide the specific issue in Epstein. See 
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming a district 
court’s final judgment that the Secret Service’s seizure of a computer hard disk drive that held private 
e-mails was not an unlawful interception under the ECPA because those e-mails were stored and not 
intercepted contemporaneously). 
 11 See Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113 (defining a contemporaneous interception of electronic communi-
cations as an interception that occurs “at the initial time of transmission”); United States v. Steiger, 
318 F.3d 1039, 1150 (11th Cir. 2003) (defining a contemporaneous interception of electronic commu-
nications as an interception that occurs while the electronic communication is “in flight,” or in the 
course of being transmitted). 
 12 Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51. 
 13 See id. at 1150 (holding that the Seventh Circuit would not take a position on whether intercep-
tions of electronic communication must occur contemporaneously, but even if interceptions must 
occur contemporaneously, Barry had stated a valid claim against Paula); see also id. at 1149 (defining 
a contemporaneous interception of electronic communications as an interception that occurs “during 
transmission” instead of after the electronic communication has reached its destination, or an intercep-
tion while the electronic communication is “in transit”). “Determinative factor” in the context of this 
Comment means a factor that ultimately determines whether a court will dismiss an action for failure 
to state a claim. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2010) (arguing that because Ashcroft v. Iqbal held 
that a judge must consider subjective factors when deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to 
state a claim, judicial discretion had now become the “determinative factor” in deciding whether a 
plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss). Consequently, even though the Seventh Circuit did not use 
the phrase determinative factor, the court effectively held that contemporaneousness was not a deter-
minative factor to state a plausible claim for the interception of electronic communication under the 
FWA as amended by the ECPA. See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51 (holding that even if the FWA only 
covers contemporaneous interceptions, Barry stated a plausible claim because the allegedly intercept-
ed e-mails may have been intercepted while in transmission). 
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ECPA, thus facilitating the ability of plaintiffs to make ECPA claims.14 The Sev-
enth Circuit’s interpretation of contemporaneousness at the pleadings stage is 
more in line with the Congressional intent of the ECPA since Congress intended 
to afford greater privacy protections to e-mails.15 Part I of this Comment exam-
ines the emergence of contemporaneousness as a determinative factor in consid-
ering unlawful interception claims as well as the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of the husband’s claim in Epstein.16 Part II discusses the different interpretations 
of contemporaneousness as a determinative factor in a claim for the unlawful 
interception of electronic communications under the ECPA.17 Finally, Part III 
argues that the Seventh Circuit’s view that contemporaneousness is not a deter-
minative factor at the pleadings stage is more in line with the Congressional in-
tent of the ECPA because it helps plaintiffs protect the privacy of their e-mails.18 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ECPA AND CONTEMPORANEOUSNESS AS A 
DETERMINATIVE FACTOR IN UNLAWFUL INTERCEPTION CLAIMS 
The ECPA was enacted in 1986 to expand protections afforded by the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“OCCSSA”).19 The 
OCCSSA provided privacy protections for wire and oral communications, 
most notably by allowing an individual to bring a private cause of action for 
the unlawful interception of their wire and oral communications.20 As an ex-
pansion to the OCCSSA’s protections against the interception of wire and oral 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 19–54 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 55–94 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
 19 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1. The ECPA amended several sections of Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code, which contains the laws that control the interception of wire, oral, and electronic 
communications. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). Judges also refer to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522—the 
codification of the ECPA, the laws which the ECPA amended, and successive amendments after the 
ECPA—as the Federal Wiretap Act or the Wiretap Act. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 
458 (referring to the FWA). The ECPA itself has been amended several times since its passage in 
1986. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis 
of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 626 (2007) (explaining how the ECPA has been 
amended significantly since it was passed in 1986). Most notably, in 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act 
amended the ECPA. Id. Nevertheless, the USA PATRIOT Act did not affect the definitions of elec-
tronic communication or interception. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 
290–91 (2001) (explaining precisely which definitions the USA PATRIOT Act would change); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (containing the updated definitions). 
 20 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 213, 
223 (establishing a cause of action for those individuals who have had their wire or oral communica-
tions unlawfully intercepted, without any mention of electronic communication). Oral communication 
was defined as any type of communication orally uttered by a person who has the expectation that 
their communication will not be intercepted. Id. at 212. Wire communication was defined as any 
communication made at least partly through transmission by wire, cable, or other similar connection. 
Id. 
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communications, Congress passed Title I of the ECPA to protect against the 
interception of electronic communications in transmission, such as e-mail.21 
The statute does not define precisely when that unlawful interception must oc-
cur.22 Section A of this part examines how courts, primarily the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have interpreted the contemporaneousness factor 
under the OCCSSA and later under the ECPA.23 Section B of this part exam-
ines the facts and procedural history of Epstein v. Epstein, in which the Sev-
enth Circuit held that contemporaneousness is a not determinative factor in 
unlawful interception claims under the ECPA.24 
A. The Evolution of an Unlawful Interception and  
the Contemporaneousness Factor 
Before the passage of the ECPA, the Fifth Circuit decided that an unlaw-
ful interception of oral communication under the OCCSSA must occur con-
temporaneously with the utterance of that oral communication.25 In United 
States v. Turk, the defendant involved in narcotics investigations alleged that 
Miami police officers had unlawfully intercepted his oral communication when 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See ECPA, 100 Stat. at 1848–50 (amending the OCCSA to cover the interception of electronic 
communications); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining electronic communication as any the trans-
fer of sensory materials by a wire or electronic system that has an effect on interstate or foreign com-
merce). When electronic communications are intercepted in transmission, the interception occurs at 
the time when a wire or electronic system is transferring sensory materials. ECPA, 100 Stat. at 1848–
49; see S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4, 8 (recognizing that the ECPA aims to protect against the interception 
of e-mail and defining e-mail as private communication typed into a computer system and then trans-
ferred via public and private telephone lines); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations 
in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1557, 1561 (2004) (arguing that privacy concerns related to personal e-
mails drove the passage of the ECPA). Title II of the ECPA, otherwise known as the Stored Commu-
nications Act, protects against the unlawful acquisition of stored electronic communications. ECPA, 100 
Stat. at 1860 (making it illegal to acquire stored electronic communication). Although beyond the scope 
of this Comment, the Stored Communications Act also plays a major role in policing government surveil-
lance of electronic communications. See Alexander Porter, Note, “Time Works Changes”: Modernizing 
Fourth Amendment Law to Protect Cell Site Location Information, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1781, 1792 (2016) 
(explaining how Congress intended for the Stored Communications Act to allow judicial oversight of 
the government surveillance of cell phone communications). 
 22 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (defining intercept without explaining precisely when an interception 
must occur in order to constitute an unlawful interception); see also ECPA, 100 Stat. at 1848–49 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510 to include the phrase electronic communication and its accompanying 
definition). 
 23 See infra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
 25 United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1976). In United States v. Turk, the court 
defined a contemporaneous interception as an interception of communication that occurs at the actual 
time that the communication is happening. Id. at 658. In fact, the Fifth Circuit was the only court to 
address the contemporaneous factor before the passage of the ECPA. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 
493 n.180 (explaining that United States v. Turk was the only pre-ECPA case that required intercep-
tions to occur contemporaneously). 
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they seized the cassette tapes of his recorded phone conversations without a 
warrant.26 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the police officers’ seizure of the 
cassette tapes was not unlawful because their conduct did not fall under the 
OCCSSA definition of interception, which is defined as “aural acquisition.”27 
Congress had previously explained that an aural acquisition means the action 
of physically hearing some wire or oral communication through some kind of 
listening device.28 
The defendant argued that the actions of the police officers constituted an 
interception because they listened to the seized cassette tapes.29 He argued that 
listening to the cassette tapes constituted an interception because a new aural 
acquisition occurs every time someone listens to a prior recording of oral com-
munication.30 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, interpreting the plain language of the 
statute to reflect Congress’s intent that an interception of oral communication 
must occur at the time that communication is happening.31 In other words, the 
interception must occur contemporaneously with the utterance of that communi-
cation.32 If contemporaneousness was not a determinative factor for an unlawful 
interception, then the OCCSSA would cover every type of surveillance, and the 
Fifth Circuit held that Congress did not intend such broad coverage.33 
Ten years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Turk, Congress passed the 
ECPA in 1986, and in doing so it added protections to electronic communica-
tions but did not specify whether an unlawful interception of electronic com-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Turk, 526 F.2d at 657. The police officers obtained the cassette tapes by stopping a car after 
receiving a tip that the passengers in that car were illegally possessing cocaine and firearms. Id. at 
656. Among other objects, the police officers found in the car cassette tapes containing recorded tele-
phone conversations. Id. The police officers took the cassette tapes back to the police station, listened 
to the tapes (all without a warrant or the car owner’s permission), and eventually found out that one of 
the tapes implicated the defendant in narcotics violations. Id. at 656–57. The defendant wanted to 
classify the actions of the police officers as an unlawful interception in an attempt to exclude the ille-
gally obtained evidence from his trial. Id. at 657. 
 27 Id. at 659 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178). 
 28 See id. at 657 (explaining that the statutory language “aural acquisition” means the action of 
physically hearing some wire or oral communication through some kind of device); see also 18 U.S.C 
§ 2510(18) (defining “aural transfer” as a transfer of the human voice between the original utterance 
of that voice and the hearing of that voice by someone else). 
 29 Turk, 526 F.2d at 658. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 659 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1097) (ruling that the interception of wire and oral commu-
nication is unlawful but that other forms of surveillance are not unlawful); see also id. at 658 (reason-
ing that if Congress had intended for each new aural acquisition of a wire or oral communication to 
constitute a new interception, Congress would have written that into the statute). 
 32 See id. at 658 & n.3 (concluding that, at the very least, an interception requires some type of 
involvement by the interceptor while the communication is happening). 
 33 See id. at 658–59 (explaining that an interception of oral communications could not occur un-
less the interception happened at the utterance of that oral communication). In explaining the congres-
sional intent behind passing the OCCSSA, the Fifth Circuit cited the OCCSSA’s corresponding con-
gressional report. See generally S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (stating explicitly that the OCCSSA does not 
cover all forms of surveillance). 
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munications had to occur contemporaneously with transmission of that com-
munication.34 As a result, several Federal Circuit Courts, including the Fifth 
Circuit, held that such an interception must occur at the same time the elec-
tronic communication is being transmitted.35 
In 1994, in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, the Fifth Circuit 
was the first appellate court to decide that contemporaneousness is a determina-
tive factor as to whether or not the interception of electronic communications is 
unlawful under the ECPA.36 The court held that even though the Secret Service 
seized a computer hard disk drive that contained private e-mails, the Secret Ser-
vice did not unlawfully intercept those e-mails under the ECPA.37 Those e-mails 
were stored on a hard disk drive and therefore not intercepted at the time those e-
mails were being transmitted.38 The Fifth Circuit further explained that Congress 
maintained the FWA’s definition of intercept—the acquisition of communication 
through some type of mechanical device—when it enacted the ECPA.39 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress intended to distinguish electron-
ic communications in storage from electronic communications in transit, be-
cause Congress defined electronic communication and electronic storage sepa-
rately under the ECPA.40 On the other hand, the definition of wire communica-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See also Levinson, supra note 2, at 493 (pointing out that no congressional materials indicate 
that the legislators took notice of Turk). See generally ECPA, 100 Stat. 1848. 
 35 See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462 (holding that Congress, when it wrote the 
ECPA, intended that an unlawful interception of electronic communication must occur at the same 
time the electronic communication is being transmitted). The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and the Eleventh 
Circuit have also held that such an interception must occur contemporaneously with transmission. 
Luis, 833 F.3d at 629; Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048–49; Konop v. Hawaiian 
Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Smith, 155 F.3d at 1059. 
 36 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462 (holding that an interception of electronic communi-
cation under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission of that electronic communi-
cation). 
 37 Id. at 463. 
 38 Id. Just as the interception of oral communication in Turk needed to occur contemporaneously 
with the utterance of oral communication, the interception of private e-mails in Steve Jackson Games 
needed to occur contemporaneously with transmission of those e-mails. See id. at 460–61 (affirming a 
district court’s holding, which cited Turk, that the Secret Service did not intercept electronic commu-
nications because the interception did not occur contemporaneously with the transmission of those e-
mails); see also Mulligan, supra note 21, at 1565 (citing Turk and Steve Jackson Games as support for 
the idea that the FWA—as amended by the ECPA—aims to regulate surveillance of Internet commu-
nications “in transit”). 
 39 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462 (citing to S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 13). Congress changed 
the phrase aural acquisition to “aural or other acquisition,” signifying that the interpretation of aural 
acquisition as interpreted under Turk should remain the same under the ECPA. Id. at 461 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986);18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1968)). 
 40 See id. at 461–62 (defining electronic communication and electronic storage by citing the 
ECPA amendments to the FWA); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12), (17) (2012) (containing the codified 
definitions from the amendments); Mulligan, supra note 21, at 1565 (breaking down the ECPA as 
covering both electronic communications in transit and electronic communications in storage). Elec-
tronic communication is defined as the “transfer” of any signals, images, or data transmitted through 
some type of electronic device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). On the other hand, electronic storage is defined 
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tion includes both wire communication in transit as well as any wire commu-
nication in storage.41 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that because Congress distin-
guished electronic communications in storage from electronic communications 
in transit, an unlawful interception of electronic communication had to occur 
contemporaneously with transmission.42 
The decision in Steven Jackson Games and subsequent decisions from the 
various Circuit Courts of Appeals stand for the proposition that contemporane-
ousness is a determinative factor in establishing whether an e-mail has been 
intercepted in violation of the ECPA.43 The Seventh Circuit partly departed 
from this practice when it held that contemporaneousness is not a determina-
tive factor at the pleadings stage, and thus should not automatically prevent a 
complainant from successfully pleading a claim for the unlawful interception 
of electronic communications under the ECPA.44 
B. The Seventh Circuit Addresses the Contemporaneousness Factor 
In May of 2011, Paula Epstein filed for divorce in the Circuit Court of 
Cook County, Illinois, after accusing her husband, Barry Epstein, of serial infi-
                                                                                                                           
as any type of “storage” of a wire or electronic communication that can be transmitted electronically. 
Id. § 2510(17). In Steve Jackson Games, the e-mails stored on a hard drive were a form of stored 
communications covered by Title II of the ECPA (the Stored Communications Act), and acquiring stored 
e-mail does not constitute a contemporaneous interception. 36 F.3d at 463. Plaintiffs prefer to bring an 
action for the interception of electronic communication as opposed to the seizure of stored electronic 
communication because statutory damages are at least ten times greater for interceptions of electronic 
communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (setting statutory damages for electronic communica-
tion interception violations at the greater of ten thousand dollars or one hundred dollars a day for each 
day of violation); Id. § 2707 (setting statutory damages for the seizure of stored electronic communi-
cation at a minimum of one thousand dollars and more than that if the actual damages are greater than 
one thousand dollars); see also Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to 
Ephemeral Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 378 (2010) (arguing that Congress plac-
es a higher value in protecting electronic communication in transit than electronic communication in 
storage). 
 41 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)). Wire communication is 
defined as any communication made at least partly through transmission by wire, cable, or other simi-
lar connection. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). 
 42 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461–62 (holding that electronic communication in storage 
cannot be intercepted because only electronic communication in transit can be intercepted such that it 
would violate the FWA); see also Roundy, supra note 5, at 418–20 (explaining how the Steve Jackson 
Games court created a distinction between electronic communication in storage and electronic com-
munication in transit based on the statutory definitions of electronic storage, electronic communica-
tion, and wire communication). 
 43 See, e.g., Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113 (citing Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461–62) (holding 
that the interception of an e-mail must occur contemporaneously to be unlawful under the ECPA); 
Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1050 (holding that e-mails intercepted contemporaneously are e-mails intercepted 
while “in flight”). 
 44 See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51 (listing three independent reasons the district court erred in 
ruling that the complaint definitively failed to plead a contemporaneous interception of electronic 
communication). 
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delity.45 Barry subsequently served a discovery request on Paula’s attorney 
asking for all potential evidence of his infidelity.46 After receiving copies of 
incriminating e-mails from Paula’s lawyer, Barry filed suit in the District Court 
of Northern Illinois pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 alleging, among other things, 
that Paula had unlawfully intercepted his e-mails in violation of the ECPA.47 
Purportedly, Paula had installed a program on Barry’s computer that automati-
cally forwarded the e-mails received and sent from Barry’s e-mail accounts to 
her e-mail accounts.48 
After Barry filed his complaint, Paula filed a motion to dismiss in which 
she asserted that Barry’s claims failed because he did not allege that Paula had 
contemporaneously intercepted the e-mails.49 Pending the motions to dismiss, 
Barry amended his complaint to allege that Paula had in fact intercepted his e-
mails contemporaneously.50 Barry’s amended complaint alleged that the e-
mails were forwarded to Paula at the same time the intended recipient e-mail 
servers received them.51 Still, Judge Thomas M. Durkin of the District Court of 
Northern Illinois granted Paula’s motions to dismiss.52 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that contemporaneousness was not a 
determinative factor as to whether or not a plaintiff has successfully pled an un-
lawful interception.53 The court held that even if the FWA only covered contem-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. at 1148. 
 46 Id. at 1148–49. 
 47 Id. Barry also alleged in his complaint that Paula’s lawyer had unlawfully disclosed those e-
mails by delivering the e-mails to Barry in response to Barry’s discovery request. Id. This claim was 
dismissed by the Northern District of Illinois, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. 
Id. An unlawful disclosure of electronic communications is actionable under the ECPA, but this is a 
separate claim from an unlawful interception. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (unlawful to intentionally 
disclose or attempt to disclose one’s wire, oral, or electronic communication). Here, Barry consented 
to the disclosure of his e-mails by Paula’s lawyer when he made the discovery request. See Epstein, 
843 F.3d at 1151–52 (holding that Barry’s claim against Paula’s lawyer failed because the FWA does 
not cover a disclosure that occurs with consent). The e-mails were incriminating because, although 
rarely prosecuted, adultery is still a crime in the state of Illinois. Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1153 (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
 48 Epstein, 2015 WL 1840650, at *1. 
 49 Id.; Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1149; see also Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113 (requiring that an e-mail inter-
ception actionable under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission of that e-mail). 
Though not relevant to the interception issue, Barry also alleged that Paula’s lawyer, Jay Frank, had 
unlawfully disclosed intercepted electronic communications. Epstein, 2015 WL 1840650, at *1. Frank 
also moved to dismiss Barry’s unlawful disclosure claim. Id. at *2. 
 50 Epstein, 2015 WL 1840650, at *1–2. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at *3. Further, Judge Durkin granted Paula’s attorney’s motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that Barry had consented to the disclosure of e-mails. Id. at *4. 
 53 See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51 (holding that even if the FWA only covers contemporaneous 
interceptions, the allegedly intercepted e-mails do not conclusively defeat Barry’s claim that Paula 
unlawfully intercepted his e-mails); see also Patricia Manson, Man Gets OK to Sue Wife Over Hack-
ing, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2016/12/15/
wife-husband-email-hack-12-15-16 [https://perma.cc/7CXF-2QUA] (explaining the court’s holding 
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poraneous interceptions, the time-stamped e-mails attached to Barry’s complaint 
did not defeat his claim against Paula for three reasons: 1) the District Court 
misunderstood when an interception actually occurs; 2) the District Court mixed 
up the e-mails the husband had received and the e-mails the husband had sent; 3) 
and discovery may bring forward other e-mails with different timestamps.54 
II. JUDGES DECIDE WHEN CONTEMPORANEOUSNESS IS A DETERMINATIVE 
FACTOR FOR AN UNLAWFUL INTERCEPTION OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE ECPA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have all held that an unlawful interception of electronic communication 
must occur contemporaneously with the transmission of that electronic commu-
nication.55 The Eleventh Circuit defined contemporaneous with transmission as 
“in flight,” or the seconds in between the communication being sent (i.e. press-
ing the send button to transmit an e-mail) and the communication being placed 
in some kind of temporary storage (i.e. an e-mail inbox).56 Other courts have 
adopted this definition as well.57 Section A of this Part examines how and why 
courts have found contemporaneousness to be a determinative factor at final 
judgment, summary judgment, and at the pleadings stage.58 Section B of this 
Part examines how and why the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
departed from the other Federal Circuit Courts in Epstein v. Epstein.59 
                                                                                                                           
that the timestamps on Barry’s e-mails that were forwarded to Paula’s e-mail address do not close off the 
possibility that the e-mails were intercepted by Paula at the time they were transmitted). Interestingly, the 
Seventh Circuit effectually also overturned another case out of the Northern District of Illinois that had 
been decided in between Judge Durkin’s order and the appeal. See Owen v. Cigna, 188 F. Supp. 3d 
790, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Judge Durkin’s order in Epstein to support the court’s dismissal of 
a claim for the unlawful interception of e-mails on the basis that the plaintiff had not shown his e-
mails were intercepted contemporaneously). But see Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 
1156328, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018) (dismissing a claim for the unlawful interception of electronic 
communication because the interception did not occur contemporaneously). 
 54 Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51. 
 55 Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2016); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 
107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Serv., 
36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 56 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Jarrod J. White, E-Mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring 
of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997)). 
 57 See Luis, 833 F.3d at 629 (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning that a contemporane-
ous interception is an interception of an electronic communication in flight, or intercepted while the 
communication is being transmitted); Krise v. Sei/Aaron’s Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1209-TWT, 2017 WL 
3608189, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2017) (quoting Steiger when defining a contemporaneous inter-
ception as an interception of electronic communication in flight). 
 58 See infra notes 60–86 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
2018] Unlawful Interception of E-Mail 401 
A. Contemporaneousness as a Determinative Factor  
for an Unlawful Interception 
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Steiger, in line with the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, held at final judgment that 
contemporaneousness is a determinative factor for an unlawful interception of 
electronic communication under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”).60 In 2003, in Steiger, a defendant-child abuser attempted to sup-
press the evidence contained in his personal computer data (a form of electron-
ic communication) because those data were acquired via an unlawful intercep-
tion under the ECPA.61 The District Court did not address the defendant’s ar-
gument that the personal computer data evidence should be suppressed under 
the ECPA.62 Nevertheless, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit held that retrieving 
the computer data was not an unlawful interception of electronic communica-
tion because, in order to constitute an unlawful interception, the acquisition of 
that data needed to occur contemporaneously with transmission of that data.63 
In other words, the communication had to have been intercepted while in 
flight.64 Like the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047–48 (citing to Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463 in its conclusion 
that unlawful interceptions of electronic communication under the ECPA must occur contemporane-
ously with transmission of that electronic communication). As previously discussed, the Fifth Circuit 
in Steve Jackson Games upheld the final judgment of the District Court for the Western District of 
Texas that the Secret Service did not unlawfully intercept private e-mails stored on an electronic bul-
letin board where those e-mails were not acquired contemporaneously with transmission and instead 
constituted stored communications. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458. As previously noted, the 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress had intended to distinguish between electronic communications 
in storage and electronic communications in transit because Congress separately defined electronic 
communication and electronic storage. See id. at 461 (defining electronic communication and elec-
tronic storage separately by citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12), (17) (2012)). 
 61 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1046. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence found on his comput-
er because the government proffered that evidence in criminal proceedings against him for alleged 
child sex abuse as well as possession and receipt of child pornography. Id. at 1041, 1046. Importantly, 
the defendant argued that where a third party had used a computer virus to surveil the defendant’s 
personal computer data, the computer virus constituted an interception. Id. at 1044. 
 62 Id. at 1046. Even if the evidence was unlawfully intercepted, the FWA only allows a criminal 
defendant to suppress unlawfully intercepted wire and oral communications and not electronic com-
munications. Id. Interestingly, and beyond the scope of this Comment, the Eleventh Circuit upheld 
that the FWA, as codified under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520, does not permit a defendant to suppress 
unlawfully intercepted electronic communications from evidence. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 
364 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305–06 (D. Utah, 2005) (holding that the FWA’s suppression remedy under 
18 U.S.C. § 2515 extends only to wire and oral communications and not electronic communications); 
Salter, supra note 40, at 378–79 (explaining that the FWA’s suppression remedy is not available for 
communications in transit that were not communicated by voice). 
 63 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048–49. 
 64 Id. The Eleventh Circuit derived the phrase “in flight” from the dictionary definition of inter-
cept, defined as the stopping or interrupting while in progress and before arrival. Id. As previously 
noted, “in flight” in the context of e-mail interceptions means the seconds in between the communica-
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reasoned that unless the electronic communication is acquired while in flight, 
that electronic communication is in storage and thus no interception has oc-
curred.65 
The Third Circuit and Ninth Circuits previously held that contemporane-
ousness is a determinative factor for an unlawful interception of electronic 
communication under the ECPA at summary judgment.66 In 2002, in Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that contemporaneous-
ness is a determinative factor at the summary judgment stage.67 In Konop, a 
supervisor used an account under someone else’s name to access and then dis-
tribute the contents of a plaintiff-employee’s website, where the plaintiff-
employee published posts criticizing the defendant-employer.68 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant-employer as to 
the unlawful interception claim because the contents of the website were not 
obtained while in transmission.69 Thus, as a matter of law, no unlawful inter-
ception existed.70 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and further explained that Con-
gress in 2001 had implicitly adopted contemporaneousness as a determinative 
factor when considering unlawful interceptions of electronic communication.71 
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Konop from United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
tion being sent and the communication being placed in some kind of temporary storage. See id. at 
1050 (quoting White, supra note 56, at 1083). 
 65 See id. at 1048–49 (citing to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to support its proposition that stored 
communications cannot be intercepted and that an interception of electronic communication can only 
occur contemporaneously with transmission of that electronic communication); see also Salter, supra 
note 40, at 378 (explaining the different treatment of electronic communication in transit and electron-
ic communication in storage in civil and criminal cases). 
 66 Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113, Konop, 302 F.3d at 879. 
 67 Konop, 302 F.3d at 879. 
 68 Id. at 873. 
 69 Id. at 878–79. Just as other courts distinguished between electronic communications in transit 
and electronic communications in storage, the Ninth Circuit in Konop explained that no interception 
occurred because the contents of the website were obtained while in storage. Id.; see also Roundy, 
supra note 5, at 420 (explaining the distinction between electronic communication in transit and elec-
tronic communication in storage). 
 70 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 878–79 (affirming summary judgment because no interception could 
have occurred unless the interception occurred contemporaneously with transmission). 
 71 Id. Specifically, the court explained that Congress had accepted the decisions of the Federal 
Circuit Courts that held contemporaneousness to be a determinative factor because Congress amended 
the FWA without addressing the issue. Id. (referring to, generally, the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
amended the FWA without changing the definition of “intercept”); see also Steve Jackson Games, 36 
F.3d at 458 (concluding, before 2001, that contemporaneousness was a requisite element in unlawful 
interception claims). Separately, the court established the secure website as a form of electronic com-
munication because an Internet server sends documents from the website to the computer of someone 
accessing those documents from the secure website. Konop, 302 F.3d at 876. Thus, the secure website 
is itself the transfer of information by an electronic system. Id. 
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Smith, a 1998 Ninth Circuit decision that held interceptions of wire communi-
cations do not need to occur contemporaneously.72 
Similarly, in June of 2003, the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of an employer who allegedly intercepted an employee’s e-
mails in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act (“FWA”).73 Evidence reflected 
that the employer’s acquisition of the employee’s previously sent and received 
e-mails did not constitute a contemporaneous interception under the ECPA.74 
The employer’s searching and subsequent acquisition of the employee’s stored 
e-mails could not constitute an unlawful interception because the employer did 
not acquire the e-mails contemporaneously with any type of transmission of 
those e-mails.75 The court based its holding on the fact that it was adopting the 
definition of contemporaneous used by other Federal Circuit Courts.76 
Most recently, and three months before the Seventh Circuit decided Ep-
stein v. Epstein, the Sixth Circuit allowed a complainant to plead that his e-
mails were unlawfully intercepted for the express reason that his complaint 
sufficiently alleged that his e-mails had been intercepted contemporaneously 
with transmission.77 Here, a husband suspicious of his wife’s online activity, 
used a software program called WebWatcher to allegedly intercept e-mails and 
online instant messages sent between his wife and the complainant.78 The 
complainant claimed that the suspicious husband and Awareness, the company 
that produced the WebWatcher software, had unlawfully intercepted his elec-
tronic communications under the FWA.79 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 877–78 (noting that United States v. Smith stands for the proposition 
that wire communications do not need to be intercepted contemporaneously with transmission); see 
also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056–58 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an interception of 
wire communications does not need to occur contemporaneously with transmission, but the FWA 
does require the interception of oral or electronic communications to occur contemporaneously with 
transmission). 
 73 Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. Just as the courts before it had done, the Third Circuit distinguished between electronic 
communications in transit and electronic communications in storage. Id. at 114. Since the employee’s 
e-mails had been obtained while stored in the employee’s e-mail inbox, no interception could have 
occurred. Id. 
 76 Id. at 113–14; see also Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048–49 (defining a contemporaneous interception of 
electronic communication as an acquisition of electronic communication in flight); Konop, 302 F.3d at 
878 (defining a contemporaneous interception of electronic communication as an acquisition of electron-
ic communication during transmission and not while in storage); Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458 
(defining a contemporaneous interception of electronic communication as an acquisition of electronic 
communication during transmission of that communication). 
 77 Luis, 833 F.3d at 625. 
 78 Id. at 624. 
 79 Id. The complainant settled his unlawful interception claim against the suspicious husband. Id. 
at 623. As support for his unlawful interception claim against Awareness, the complainant pointed to 
advertising materials in which Awareness had advertised Web Watcher as a program allowing users to 
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The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, on the recommenda-
tion of a magistrate judge, granted Awareness’ motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).80 The court held that the complainant 
had failed to allege a plausible unlawful interception claim against Awareness, 
and the court defined an unlawful interception as an interception occurring 
contemporaneously with transmission.81 The Sixth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case, with two important holdings: first, a complainant must plead 
that an unlawful interception under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 must occur contempora-
neously with transmission.82 Second, the complainant here did sufficiently 
plead that Awareness contemporaneously intercepted his e-mails and other 
online messages.83 
The Sixth Circuit inferred that because Awareness had advertised Web-
Watcher as a software that could acquire electronic communication “in near real-
time,” Awareness was likely acquiring the complainant’s e-mails and instant 
messages as soon as those electronic communications were sent.84 In other 
words, the electronic communications were intercepted contemporaneously with 
transmission.85 By reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss because the com-
plainant pled a contemporaneous interception, the Sixth Circuit implied that con-
temporaneousness is a determinative factor at the pleadings stage of a claim for 
the unlawful interception of electronic communications under the ECPA.86 
                                                                                                                           
view someone’s electronic communications “in near real-time.” See id. at 631 (exposing the contents 
of certain Awareness advertising materials). 
 80 Id. at 625. 
 81 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a claim is plausible and 
can survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the facts in the plaintiff’s pleading “allow[] the court 
to draw [a] reasonable inference” that the plaintiff would win on their claim). The district court grant-
ed the motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was the suspicious husband and not Awareness that 
had intercepted the complainant’s e-mails. Luis, 833 F.3d at 625. The Sixth Circuit reversed this par-
ticular holding for reasons not relevant to this discussion. Id. at 627. 
 82 Luis, 833 F.3d at 629. The FWA establishes that an intentional interception of electronic com-
munication is an unlawful interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). 
 83 Luis, 833 F.3d at 630. The court’s reference to a sufficient pleading refers to the heightened 
pleading standard necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (establishing 
that a complaint puts forth a plausible claim when the facts in the plaintiff’s complaint “allow[] the 
court to draw [a] reasonable inference” that the plaintiff would win on their claim). 
 84 Luis, 833 F.3d at 631. 
 85 See id. at 629–31 (describing Awareness’s acquisition of the complainant’s electronic commu-
nication as a contemporaneous interception because WebWatcher was advertised as a program that 
captures communications at the same time the communications are transmitted). The Sixth Circuit 
also pointed to the complaint, which specifically stated that the e-mails and instant messages were not 
previously stored by the complainant. Id. at 630. The complaint further stated that Awareness had 
acquired the e-mails and instant messages as they were being written and sent. Id. 
 86 See id. at 630–31 (reversing the dismissal because the complainant’s allegation that Web-
Watcher “instantaneously” routed communications to its servers, combined with Awareness’s adver-
tising materials, allowed the court to infer that Awareness had contemporaneously intercepted the 
complainant’s electronic communications). 
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B. The Application of Contemporaneousness as a Determinative Factor  
at the Pleadings Stage of an Unlawful Interception  
Claim Under the ECPA in Epstein v. Epstein 
In Epstein v. Epstein, the Seventh Circuit did not decide whether or not 
interceptions of electronic communication had to occur contemporaneously 
with transmission.87 Instead, the court decided that contemporaneousness was 
not a determinative factor that would automatically dismiss a plaintiff’s unlaw-
ful interception claim.88 In other words, a court could make the reasonable in-
ference that a plaintiff would succeed in his or her claim even without a com-
plaint that lays out the specifics of when the interception of electronic commu-
nication occurred.89 Printed versions of the allegedly intercepted e-mails at-
tached to Barry’s complaint suggested that Paula received the e-mails well af-
ter Barry had sent those e-mails.90 Nevertheless, the court explained that an 
interception occurs at the e-mail server, not when the interceptor (in this case, 
Paula) receives those e-mails.91 
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit decided it could reasonably infer 
(based on Barry’s complaint) that Barry would successfully prove Paula con-
temporaneously intercepted his e-mails.92 In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that 
making the reasonable inference that a plaintiff would succeed in an unlawful 
interception claim does not require a court to decide at the pleadings stage that 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Epstein v. Epstein, 843 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2016). Significantly, the court pointed to 
another Seventh Circuit case that dealt with the alleged unlawful interception of e-mails. See United 
States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an employee unlawful-
ly intercepted his supervisor’s e-mails because the employee could access the intercepted e-mails 
almost immediately after transmission). The Seventh Circuit explained that, in United States v. 
Szymuszkiewicz, it did not decide whether contemporaneousness was a factor to consider in unlawful 
interception claims. Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150. Rather, Szymuszkiewicz left that question open. Id. 
 88 See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51 (holding that even if the FWA only covers contemporaneous 
interceptions, the allegedly intercepted e-mails do not defeat Barry’s claim that Paula unlawfully in-
tercepted his e-mails). 
 89 Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that a claim is plausible when a court can “draw a 
reasonable inference” that the plaintiff would win on his or her claim based on the facts in the com-
plaint). 
 90 See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150 (explaining that the shortest interval of time in between Barry 
sending or receiving an e-mail and that same e-mail being forwarded to Paula’s e-mail account was 
three hours). 
 91 Id.; see also Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 704 (explaining that an unlawful interception of e-mail 
communications occurs when the e-mails are “copied at the server”). An e-mail server is a centralized 
computer system that transfers e-mails in between e-mail accounts. Mail Server, COMPUTER HOPE (Dec. 
29, 2017), https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/m/mailserv.htm [https://perma.cc/7XU3-386K]. 
 92 See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150 (containing the court’s explicit holding that Barry’s complaint 
could withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s inference seems more like 
the standard of getting past the “speculative level” that the Sixth Circuit points to in Luis v. Zang. See 
id. (establishing that Barry Epstein pled a viable ECPA claim); see also Luis, 833 F.3d at 630 (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (holding that factual allegations must go be-
yond the “speculative level” in order to survive a motion to dismiss). 
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the interception occurred contemporaneously with transmission.93 The Seventh 
Circuit’s holding that contemporaneousness is not a determinative factor at the 
pleadings stage of an unlawful interception claim reflects the Congressional 
intent of the ECPA.94 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN EPSTEIN V. EPSTEIN IS MORE IN 
LINE WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF THE ECPA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Epstein v. 
Epstein reflects Congress’ intent in drafting the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”).95 Congress passed the ECPA in large part to protect the 
privacy of electronic communications, such as e-mail.96 Despite several 
amendments to the Federal Wiretap Act (“FWA”) since the passage of the 
ECPA, Congress has not altered the ECPA provisions that aimed to protect the 
privacy of electronic communications.97 
In 1986, Congress amended the FWA by passing the ECPA because 
members of Congress were particularly concerned with protecting the privacy 
of e-mail communications.98 The FWA has been amended several times since 
1986, but no amendments have affected the definitions of electronic communi-
cation or unlawful interception.99 Even though Congress has amended certain 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit used a line of reasoning 
similar to the line of reasoning used by the Sixth Circuit in Luis. See Epstein, 843 F.3d at 1150–51 
(laying out the three elements of the court’s reasoning); cf. 833 F.3d at 630–31 (holding that potential 
evidence attached to a complaint and the plaintiff’s allegations allowed the court to make a reasonable 
inference that the plaintiff would succeed in his claim). In Luis, the Sixth Circuit overturned a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal because the relationship between the defendant’s marketing materials and the plaintiff’s 
allegations allowed the court to make a reasonable inference that the plaintiff would succeed on his 
claim. 833 F.3d at 630. Similarly, by laying out the three reasons it did in Epstein, the Seventh Circuit 
overturned a 12(b)(6) dismissal because the relationship between the defendant’s time stamped e-
mails and the plaintiff’s allegations allowed the court to make a reasonable inference that Barry could 
succeed on his claim. See 843 F.3d at 1150–51 (reversing the judgment of the District Court with 
regard to Paula’s 12(b)(6) motion). 
 94 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress passed the ECPA in part 
to facilitate the ability of complainants to plead plausible claims for the unlawful interception of elec-
tronic communication). 
 95 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
 98 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3–4 (1986) as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556–58 (cit-
ing a letter written in 1984 from Senator Patrick Leahy to the Department of Justice in which Senator 
Leahy inquired as to whether current federal law protected e-mail and computer-to-computer commu-
nications); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 21–22, 34 (1986) (elaborating on the expansion of the ECPA to 
cover electronic communications, which includes electronic mail). 
 99 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 290–91 (2001) (amending 
the definitions section of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2510, without changing certain definitions en-
acted by the ECPA, including those of “electronic communication” and “interception”); see also 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Congress chose 
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parts of the FWA since 1986, the ECPA was the last comprehensive set of 
amendments to the FWA.100 
Contemporaneousness as a factor determinative of whether an intercep-
tion of electronic communication ultimately occurred may still well be part of 
Congress’ intent in passing the ECPA.101 Nevertheless, the overarching goal of 
the ECPA was to protect the privacy of electronic communications, most nota-
bly e-mail.102 More specifically, the ECPA was established to provide protec-
tions against the intentional interception of electronic communications.103 Con-
sequently, Congress likely did not intend for a plaintiff like Barry Epstein—
whose e-mails were surreptitiously obtained—to be dismissed out of court be-
cause his complaint and affidavit arguably did not establish contemporaneous-
ness.104 The legislative history of the ECPA reflects that Congress intended for 
the law to expand access to civil actions for unlawful surveillance.105 
Further, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Epstein is in line with a holding 
from an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that the ECPA does 
not necessarily require an interception of electronic communication to occur 
                                                                                                                           
not to change the definition of an unlawful interception of electronic communication when it amended 
the FWA in 2001). 
 100 See Adam Gillaspie, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications 
Act: Why Microsoft Corp. v. United States Signals That Technology Has Surpassed Law, 66 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2017) (explaining that the ECPA was the last major amendment to the FWA). 
 101 See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that an interception must occur contemporaneously with transmission because that was Congress’s 
intent when it separated the definitions of “electronic communication” and “stored communication”). 
Although, if stored e-mail is sent and then intercepted in transit, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that such e-mails are electronic communications and such an interception is unlawful under the 
ECPA. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005). This bolsters the claim that 
Congress intended for the ECPA definitions of “interception” and “electronic communication” to 
help, not hinder, the ability of plaintiffs to bring unlawful interception claims. See id. (holding that a 
plaintiff potentially had an unlawful interception claim where confusion existed concerning the classi-
fication between stored communication and transmitted electronic communication). 
 102 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3–4 (citing a letter written in 1984 from Senator Patrick Leahy to 
the Department of Justice in which Senator Leahy inquired as to whether current federal law protected 
e-mail and computer-to-computer communications); see also Roundy, supra note 5, at 403 (explain-
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privacy protections to electronic communications by providing protections against the interception of 
those communications); see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1853 (adding the word “intentionally” to 18 U.S.C. § 2511 in order to clarify the 
requisite state of mind necessary for an unlawful interception). 
 104 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34–35 (explaining that the ECPA’s inclusion of “electronic 
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contemporaneously.106 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the government’s indictment because the court 
believed that Congress did not necessarily intend to require interceptions of elec-
tronic communication to occur contemporaneously with transmission under the 
ECPA.107 Given the lack of consistency among the various Circuit Courts that 
have interpreted the contemporaneousness factor, the Seventh Circuit in Epstein 
correctly held that the precise time when the electronic communication was in-
tercepted should not determine the fate of a plaintiff’s complaint.108 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Epstein v. Epstein helped an unfaithful 
husband, but the court’s holding has the potential to facilitate the ability of all 
plaintiffs to protect the privacy of their personal e-mails.109 Contemporaneous-
ness may still be necessary to ultimately establish an unlawful interception 
under the ECPA, but it should not be the determinative factor that prohibits a 
plaintiff from having their day in court.110 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporaneousness is a court-interpreted factor used to determine 
whether an interception has actually occurred in a claim for the unlawful inter-
ception of electronic communications under the FWA. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held in Epstein v. Epstein that contemporaneous-
ness is not a determinative factor at the pleadings stage of an unlawful inter-
ception claim. A plausible claim for the unlawful interception of electronic 
communication does not need to show that the interception of electronic com-
munication occurred at the precise time the electronic communication was in 
transit. Such a holding stands in line with the Congressional intent of the 
ECPA, which sought to increase the privacy protections afforded to electronic 
communications such as e-mails. 
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